Following revelations from families about some U.S. service members aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln struggling with mental health after 250 days without a port visit, sailors, retirees and lawmakers told Military Times that troops were absorbing consequences of longtime flaws within the sea service that have been worsened by the current conflict.

The Navy has struggled for years to meet high operational tempo demands, they said. Deployments are regularly extended, scheduled maintenance is missed and the shipbuilding pace remains glacial, leading to delays in delivery and an undersized fleet.

The issues have spanned multiple presidential administrations but have been compounded by the handling of the Iran war and ensuing military operations, sources said, leading to dire circumstances for some sailors.

Leaders have disputed the descriptions of deteriorating conditions aboard the Lincoln and denied reporting about quality-of-life concerns.

Asked recently by reporters about families’ concerns over the length of the deployment, President Donald Trump dismissed the question, saying that it’s “not nearly long enough.”

Asked about those same concerns, Adm. Daryl Caudle, the service’s chief of naval operations, told Military Times, “Sailors first is not a slogan — it’s a warfighting imperative.”

“The sustained pace of operations in the Middle East has only reinforced that taking care of our sailors and maintaining combat readiness are inseparable,” Caudle said.

‘We need more ships’

Following outcry about conditions aboard the Lincoln, the Navy moved the Nimitz-class carrier USS George Washington from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East, where it arrived Wednesday. The ship is reportedly replacing the Lincoln, which will now steam toward its homeport of San Diego.

The move temporarily leaves the western Pacific without a U.S. aircraft carrier, the presence of which is a key part of the U.S. military’s effort to deter China in the South China Sea and reassure regional allies.

Operational tempo concerns, meanwhile, are nothing new for the service, according to retired Vice Adm. Fozzie Miller, who served as commander of U.S. Fifth Fleet and U.S. Central Command from 2012 to 2015.

Miller joined the Navy in 1979. From his early days in uniform, the service’s goal, he said, was to operate at a level that was neither too harsh for the individual sailor nor too unbearable for the equipment vital to mission success. An adequate number of warships was integral to maintaining that balance.

“We could use more carriers or less [operational] tempo,” Miller said. “It’s one or the other, but we’re a global Navy with global responsibilities, and so if we’re going to fulfill those, we need more ships.”

Rear Adm. Thomas Moore, who led the Navy’s acquisition program and went on to become commander of Naval Sea Systems Command, told Congress in 2013 that the service is “an 11-carrier Navy in a 15-carrier world.”

The demand is unlikely to dwindle, he said.

Thirteen years since Moore’s statement, the Navy is still at 11 carriers. With the USS Nimitz scheduled to retire at the end of next year, that number may soon be 10.

The USS Harry S. Truman and USS Gerald R. Ford are currently sidelined for maintenance after deployments, the latter of which notched a post-Vietnam record 326 days at sea in May after it was extended to support operations in the Middle East. The Nimitz-class USS John C. Stennis is undergoing a years-long overhaul.

The USS Ronald Reagan, also a Nimitz-class, is expected to be deployable by the end of August after a 17-month repair period. The Nimitz-class USS George H.W. Bush is in the Middle East.

“We just don’t have enough aircraft carriers right now in this rotation to sustain all the things we want to do, and I think this is a long-standing problem,” said Steven Wills, a Navy surface warfare officer who retired after 20 years.

In 2014, the Navy began implementing the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, or OFRP, deployment model, which places maintenance, training, evaluations and a single eight-month deployment within a 36-month cycle.

The service says the framework is intended to produce a more comprehensively manned and trained force while providing predictability to deployment schedules for sailors and their families.

In 2016, however, the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that heavy operational demands led the Navy to increase ship deployment lengths and reduce or defer ship maintenance.

Those decisions made deployments less predictable, ate into training time, contributed to declining ship conditions and increased the time ships required for much-needed maintenance.

From fiscal 2014 through 2019, Navy ships spent more than 33,700 additional days in maintenance beyond intended scheduling, leading to fewer vessels available for training or operations.

An upended supply network

While the Navy has long struggled with carrier availability, current U.S. leadership has created more operational tempo issues through poor planning and insufficient wartime support, according to lawmakers and a sailor who deployed in support of the Iran war.

“Logistics was a complete failure the entire time out there — food, supplies, parts,” said the sailor, who served aboard an Independence-class littoral combat ship and was granted anonymity due to fear of reprisal.

Iranian attacks damaged the Navy’s longstanding logistics hub in Bahrain in February, disrupting the regional supply network supporting ships operating in the Middle East.

The Navy shifted the new logistics hub to Naval Support Facility Diego Garcia, an atoll in the Indian Ocean that sits more than 2,000 miles away from the service’s carrier strike groups in the Middle East.

Diego Garcia’s distance proved to be problematic, the sailor said, with the hub requiring the LCS to place a food order 30 days in advance.

Those orders were nearly impossible, however, with an influx schedule exacerbated by poor planning, the sailor added. Sailors were unable to resupply from the hub, instead grabbing whatever could be salvaged from replenishment-at-sea oilers.

“There’s no excuse for why, if we’re at war, we can’t get an expedited food order,” the sailor said.

Rep. Mike Levin, D-Calif., told Military Times that the logistical issues described by the sailor were due to preparation failures.

“I’ve spoken to a lot of people who’ve been deployed, and you know, the basic problem seems to be that if they were going to use Bahrain as a hub to restock, to get food and to provide rest and all that,” Levin said. “If that was the idea, well, clearly that didn’t work out. After February, March — [the administration] should have thought of that.”

‘People can break, too’

At least two sailors attempted to jump overboard from the USS Abraham Lincoln, families of Lincoln sailors previously told Military Times.

While the individual mental circumstances of the incidents remain unknown, the frantic operational tempo of combat operations inevitably takes a natural toll on service members, according to one sailor who has deployed to the Middle East aboard an aircraft carrier during the current conflict.

“Just like machines, people can break, too,” said the service member, who was granted anonymity for fear of reprisal from leadership. “They need rest.”

Time to rest was not always available. Losing sleep was sometimes part of ensuring safety.

If equipment broke, sailors would, at times, work well beyond normal shifts until it was fixed. In some instances, completion of the task could mean the difference between life and death.

In a 2021 review, the GAO found that just 14% of Navy officers surveyed slept at least seven hours per night during a recent deployment, while 67% reported five hours or less. GAO also found that the Navy routinely assigned fewer sailors to ships than workload studies indicated were needed to safely operate them.

By 2023, surface-fleet sailors were averaging 5.25 hours of sleep every 24 hours, below the Navy’s standard of providing at least 7.5 hours of sleep opportunity. GAO identified crew shortfalls and mattress problems as challenges to managing fatigue.

For its part, the Navy has implemented measures to try to address the issue, including initiating a study involving about 1,600 sailors wearing Oura rings to monitor sleep and other biometric indicators while underway.

But lack of sleep, according to personnel, has been just one detriment experienced during the conflict with Iran. Service members have also faced food shortages onboard the carrier, the sailor said, with quality that fluctuated between bad and horrible.

“It was either undercooked, overcooked or unrecognizable at all,” the sailor said.

As extensions piled on, a decline in morale took on a recognizable tone at the phone center or in conversations at the galleys. Humor darkened even more than usual, and port visits meant less and less.

“These things have been happening on deployments for always,” said Parker Moore, a nuclear reactor operator who served aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln before its recent deployment. “It is bad, but it is always bad.”

During Moore’s time on Lincoln, the stigma surrounding mental health remained prevalent. There were mental health professionals aboard the ship, but if a sailor sought help, the service member could be taken off their job.

“They’re terrified to disappoint the people around them,” Moore said. “If I don’t do my job, there’s only 30 people who can do it, right? So now there’s only 29 people.”

Following the report on mental health issues aboard Lincoln, the Navy said it had not observed an increase in suicidal ideation or suicide attempts. The service did note, however, that additional counselors and resources were being sent to the crew.

Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Central Command, visited Lincoln on Saturday and issued a statement claiming that the ship had the lowest number of mental health cases among the Navy’s 11 active aircraft carriers.

Lack of transparency

The Pentagon under the Trump administration has become increasingly tight-lipped over the information it provides to Congress.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth released a memo in October 2025 informing Defense Department personnel, including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that authorization was required for any communication to leaders on Capitol Hill.

Hegseth also dodged several questions from lawmakers during a July Senate hearing on the Iran War.

When Sen. Jon Ossoff, D-Ga., asked the Pentagon leader whether previous statements about Iran’s military being “destroyed” and “made combat ineffective” were true, Hegseth declined to answer.

Hegseth has also not held a Pentagon press briefing about the Iran war for more than 100 days, with the last coming on May 5.

To alleviate concerns over short-term problems with current military operations like those aboard the Lincoln, Congress must be able to carry out oversight, lawmakers said.

Rep. Betty McCollum, D-Minn., told Military Times that the Pentagon should be sharing information that would allow political leaders to assess whether the president and defense secretary were deploying assets in the most mission-effective way.

Invoking the War Powers Resolution would allow lawmakers to hold the current administration accountable, some Democrats have argued.

The resolution requires the executive branch to notify Congress within 48 hours of deploying military forces and allows lawmakers to enforce the removal of military forces within 60 to 90 days unless Congress has declared war or authorized military force.

Levin supports that approach, he said, and asked that his Republican colleagues stand up and ask tough questions.

Republican members of the House and Senate armed services committees did not respond to Military Times’ requests for comment.

“I think back to George W. Bush,” Levin said. “I disagreed wholeheartedly with Iraq, but you think about the steps that he took. You think about … Secretary Rumsfeld, Vice President Cheney, others — their consistent engagement.”

For the LCS sailor, planning deficiencies are already rearing their head.

Though the ship did assist with the Navy’s blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, turning away more than a dozen vessels, it will now be sidelined longer than scheduled because of deferred repairs.

It is one example, the sailor said, of there being no long-term plan for ship rotations.

“‘We’re gonna keep you out here,” the sailor said of the impression made on them, “until your ship can’t operate or function anymore.’”

Deputy Defense Secretary Steve Feinberg told defense-industry leaders in an Aug. 5 memo that they have 21 days to submit plans for “significantly faster, more aggressive delivery schedules and/or increased production for critical capabilities.”

“Years-long development cycles are not acceptable,” Feinberg wrote. “We must dramatically accelerate our program schedules and expand our production capacity now.”

The memo also asks companies to propose specific capital investments and facility expansions and to explain how they would work with the Pentagon to increase weapons production. Feinberg also called on industry to demonstrate its willingness to “put skin in the game.” Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said the responses will help inform the department’s fiscal 2028 budget request.

The increased demand comes as the U.S. has used large quantities of advanced munitions during the conflict with Iran, with recent estimates showing declines in stocks of key missile interceptors.

A Center for Strategic and International Studies analysis estimated that U.S. stocks of Patriot interceptors fell from 2,330 before the war with Iran, to between 759 and 827 after the latest round of operations. THAAD interceptor stocks fell from 452 to between 234 and 278.

The Pentagon’s challenge is not identifying how many interceptors have been used, but how quickly they can be replaced. CSIS estimates the delivery timeline for Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors at about 42 months and about 53 months for THAAD.

The urgent 21-day deadline was communicated to arms manufacturers like Boeing, Lockheed Martin and RTX.

RTX said in July that it had received its first U.S. domestic production order for GEM-T Patriot interceptors in more than 30 years, in a roughly $442 million Army contract. The order comes as the Pentagon not only seeks to increase production of newer Patriot and THAAD interceptors but also to expand its capacity for the components required to build them.

On July 27, the department announced seven-year framework agreements with industry to expand production of key propulsion components for PAC-3 MSE and THAAD interceptors. L3Harris said its PAC-3 agreement will nearly triple production of a range of propulsion products supporting the interceptor, while its THAAD agreement is intended to quadruple production of key propulsion components.

Feinberg’s memo asks companies to identify the areas where they can increase and accelerate production and delivery, and what would be required from the Pentagon in order to make that happen. The department will use the responses to determine what industry can deliver faster and what additional resources may be needed.

The memo’s scope extends beyond weapons used in the Iran conflict. Feinberg identified 16 critical programs under consideration for accelerated production or increased procurement in the fiscal 2028 review, including the Next Generation Interceptor, the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System (NASAMS), a mobile air defense radar system and a space-based missile-tracking system.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found the contract was never terminated; no work was removed, there was no reduction in its scope or value, and no funds were deobligated, according to a GAO review released on Aug. 6.

GAO’s review found that after DHA officials discussed the contract with DOGE, DOGE agreed that no action should be taken to terminate it, yet the $1.76 billion savings claim remains on DOGE’s Wall of Receipts.

DOGE’s April 14, 2025 entry identifies A1FedImpact and “Geographic Service Providers.” Data reported by DOGE and provided to Military Times by GAO shows about $1.83 billion listed as the total contract value and $1.76 billion in savings, with $62 million listed as the amount currently obligated.

DOGE’s Wall of Receipts says contract savings are calculated as the difference between a contract’s total value and the amount currently obligated. But GAO could not determine how DOGE arrived at those figures because DOGE did not respond to the watchdog’s requests for meetings or documentation.

DHA program and acquisition officials told GAO there were no savings associated with the contract because nothing was canceled or deobligated, and no work was removed.

The contract, HT001523D0002, was one of six awards made by DHA in 2023 under a multiple-award, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) vehicle with a $2.4 billion ceiling. The vehicle was designed to provide standardized enterprise information technology support to medical treatment facilities and other lines of business across the Defense Health Agency in the United States and overseas.

Its scope includes IT service desks, database, application and web development, identity management and desktop support, data center operations, information assurance, network operations, telecommunications, clinical informatics and information business operations.

DHA managed 736 medical facilities in the United States and overseas in fiscal year 2023, according to GAO. Those facilities included hospitals, medical centers, ambulatory and occupational health clinics and dental clinics.

The $2.4 billion figure is separate from the roughly $1.83 billion “Total Contract” figure displayed in DOGE’s record for the A1FedImpact entry.

On April 10, 2025, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth issued a memorandum directing the termination of several Defense Department contracts as part of an effort to eliminate what the department characterized as wasteful spending.

The memorandum said the identified terminations represented $5.1 billion in spending and nearly $4 billion in estimated savings. It included a Defense Health Agency consulting-services contract among the identified actions.

Four days later, DOGE posted the A1FedImpact Geographic Service Providers entry on its Wall of Receipts, reporting $1.76 billion in savings.

DHA officials subsequently met with DOGE to discuss the work being performed under the contract. After that discussion, DOGE agreed that no action should be taken to terminate it, according to GAO.

GAO reviewed contract documentation and federal procurement data and found no complete or partial termination, no reduction in scope or value and no deobligation of funds. GAO concluded that no savings were achieved on the contract.

GAO also found no evidence that DOGE later removed, revised or corrected the $1.76 billion claim. GAO told Military Times that the claim remains reported on the Wall of Receipts, which DOGE last updated Jan. 1, 2026. The site remained live as of July 7, when GAO completed its review period.

GAO found broader discrepancies in DOGE’s contract-savings reporting. DOGE reported more than $61 billion in savings associated with 13,476 contracts it identified as terminated.

Of those contracts, GAO found that 2,503 of them, representing $27.4 billion in reported savings, had no termination action recorded in federal procurement data. GAO also found that DOGE did not use its stated methodology to calculate the majority of reported contract savings.

Military Times asked DHA what its officials told DOGE, whether the agency sought correction of the savings claim and whether the contract continued after DOGE reported the savings. DHA had not responded by publication time.

The White House was asked how DOGE arrived at the $1.76 billion figure and whether the administration stands by it as actual savings. The White House had not responded by publication time.

Military Times also asked A1FedImpact whether it was notified of a termination or reduction and whether work continued under the DHA vehicle. The company had not responded by publication time.

The agreements come as demand for Patriot and THAAD interceptors has increased following conflicts in Iran and Ukraine that strained U.S. missile inventories. They also come days after a Center for Strategic and International Studies analysis estimated the United States had depleted roughly two-thirds of its pre-war Patriot interceptor inventory during the conflict with Iran.

Defense officials said the agreements are intended to support the department’s long-term procurement objective of nearly 14,000 Patriot and THAAD interceptors by providing sustained demand signals to critical suppliers throughout the defense industrial base. The initiative is designed to triple production capacity for Patriot Advanced Capability-3, or PAC-3, Missile Segment Enhancement interceptors and quadruple production capacity for THAAD interceptors.

DoD said it will work directly with key component suppliers instead of relying solely on prime contractors, encouraging investment in advanced tooling, facility modernization and workforce development needed to sustain higher production rates.

“Building the Arsenal of Freedom requires robust, dynamic supply chains at every level of the industrial base,” Michael P. Duffey, under secretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said in a statement. “Framework agreements with munition components suppliers like Northrop Grumman are vital to accelerating the tripling of PAC-3 and quadrupling of THAAD interceptor production.”

The agreements establish a second source for Patriot solid rocket motors, expand production of ignition safety devices for PAC-3 interceptors and increase manufacturing capacity for key THAAD structural components, including mid-body shells, muzzle covers and rail car assemblies.

The initiative is part of the Defense Department’s Acquisition Transformation Strategy and was developed in coordination with the Missile Defense Agency, the Munitions Acceleration Council and the Economic Defense Unit to strengthen the resilience of the missile production supply chain.

Using publicly available information on missile expenditures, production rates and estimated U.S. inventories, the Washington-based think tank estimates the U.S. has expended about 65% of its Patriot inventory, leaving fewer than 1,000 interceptors remaining. The analysis also estimates U.S. inventories of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, interceptors have declined by about 38%, leaving an estimated 234 to 278 interceptors.

CSIS concluded the greater strategic risk is not sustaining the current conflict but responding to another high-intensity contingency before Patriot and THAAD inventories can be rebuilt. According to the analysis, depleted inventories could force the U.S. and its coalition partners to accept greater operational risk during air-defense operations by conserving interceptors or prioritizing only the highest-value threats.

Patriot interceptors are among the U.S. military’s primary defenses against ballistic missiles and are used to protect troops, military installations and allied populations from incoming attacks. During the Iran conflict, Patriot and THAAD systems helped defend U.S. forces and partner nations against ballistic missile attacks, although some missiles penetrated air defenses and caused casualties and damage.

In the assessment, CSIS analysts Mark Cancian and Chris Park wrote that U.S. forces expended large quantities of air-defense interceptors during the initial phase of Operation Epic Fury, leaving significantly fewer missiles available as operations resumed.

“There are no good alternatives to Patriot and THAAD for ballistic missile defense,” the duo concluded in their report.

Their findings further detail that rebuilding depleted interceptor inventories will take multiple years, raising readiness concerns for other theaters.

The Pentagon has not publicly confirmed the inventory estimates contained in the CSIS analysis and did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The Army this week awarded Lockheed Martin a contract worth up to $58.6 billion to produce Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement, or PAC-3 MSE, interceptors through fiscal 2032. The multiyear agreement is intended to expand production capacity as demand for the air-defense missile continues to grow.

“It takes several years to produce a missile. If you put money into the system today, you wouldn’t get a missile for three or four years. Sometimes even five,” Cancian told the BBC. “What we’re getting now are missiles that were funded in 2023.”

That production timeline, CSIS said, leaves a near- to medium-term window of risk if the U.S. is forced to respond to another major conflict before interceptor stockpiles are restored.

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby announced on X Tuesday that the Defense Department had “kicked off” the review Hegseth unveiled during the NATO defense ministerial in Brussels on June 18. Hegseth described the effort at the time as “a real review” of America’s force posture and basing in Europe.

Neither Hegseth’s announcement nor Colby’s statement announced troop reductions, unit movements or installation changes as part of the review. The Pentagon also has not said when the review’s recommendations will be released.

The review follows repeated calls by Trump administration officials for European allies to assume greater responsibility for NATO’s conventional defense as the administration reassesses U.S. force posture worldwide.

Hegseth said the review is expected to take up to six months, but it “could be less.” He shared that the review will include input from U.S. European Command as well as consultations with Congress and U.S. allies.

Colby said the review is designed to ensure NATO is “moving fast and irreversibly toward Europe taking primary responsibility for its conventional defense.” He explained the outcome of the review is intended to accelerate NATO’s transition to what he described as “a stronger, more equitable, and sustainable alliance.”

The Pentagon review aims to ensure U.S. force posture in Europe reflects the 2025 National Security Strategy and the 2026 National Defense Strategy. Colby said the department will develop a range of options based on “strategic rigor, a strong empirical baseline, and a clear sense of the geopolitical and military realities.”

Colby also said he looks forward to working closely with Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, on the review. He noted that the Defense Department plans to have “extensive consultations” with European allies, Congress and other parts of the U.S. government throughout the process.