{"id":64864,"date":"2023-08-08T13:26:26","date_gmt":"2023-08-08T13:26:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/staging.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/uncategorized\/2023\/08\/08\/new-zealand-unveils-defense-strategy-documents-heres-what-they-say\/"},"modified":"2026-08-08T00:56:01","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T00:56:01","slug":"new-zealand-unveils-defense-strategy-documents-heres-what-they-say","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/staging.sightlinemg.com\/defensenews\/global\/asia-pacific\/2023\/08\/08\/new-zealand-unveils-defense-strategy-documents-heres-what-they-say\/","title":{"rendered":"New Zealand unveils defense strategy documents. Here\u2019s what they say."},"content":{"rendered":"\n

WELLINGTON, New Zealand \u2014 New Zealand has released three defense and national security documents outlining prevailing challenges, principals for its military and ways to improve the force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Defence Minister Andrew Little on Aug. 4 presented to lawmakers a 36-page \u201cDefence Policy and Strategy Statement,<\/a>\u201d a 12-page \u201cFuture Force Design Principles<\/a>\u201d document and an inaugural 44-page \u201cNational Security Strategy<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cA year ago we commissioned the Defence Policy Review, to provide a roadmap for the future of Defence as part of the national security of New Zealand, and to do so in the context of the rapidly changing conditions we see around us,\u201d Little said, per a transcript<\/a> of a speech in which he introduced the documents. \u201cOne of the first actions [Prime Minister] Chris Hipkins government took was to speed up work on that review.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Overall, the documents outline challenges and pressures; introduce \u201csliding principles\u201d and four underlying assumptions; and conclude that, in the mid- to long-term period, investment in the military is needed to \u201ccontinue to protect and promote New Zealand\u2019s interests.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Threats<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

\u201cIn 2023 we do not live in a benign strategic environment,\u201d Little said. \u201cNew Zealand is facing more geostrategic challenges than we have had in decades \u2014 climate change, terrorism, cyberattacks, transnational crime, mis and disinformation, and competition in our region which, up until recently, we thought was protected by its remoteness.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Those challenges appear to have overtaken expectations, with the government writing that the military \u201cis designed for a relatively benign strategic environment, and not the challenges of increased strategic competition and the adverse effects of climate change that the Defence Policy and Strategy Statement 2023 identifies. As a result, it is not in a fit state to respond to future challenges.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cA rough sea can still be navigated,\u201d the government wrote, and \u201ceven in difficult times we can act to find our way through.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But it\u2019s unclear how that could be the case, given the \u201cDefence Policy and Strategy Statement\u201d acknowledges it \u201cdoes not in itself address capability investment questions or require particular investment tracks to be adopted.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"
New Zealand’s defense minister, Andrew Little, attends a meeting at Parliament on Feb. 8, 2023, in Wellington. (Hagen Hopkins\/Getty Images)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Instead, the document includes \u201ca range of defence activities which can be delivered in various combinations of scalable defence capabilities, from defence diplomacy through to combat operations. The task of examining how to best match capabilities to these activities, and balancing the required resourcing with associated trade-offs on policy outcomes, is the subject of a future capability planning process.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

More specifically, the government calls out regional neighbors as threats to \u201cexisting international rules and norms.\u201d Those countries include \u201can increasingly powerful China\u201d that \u201ccontinues to invest heavily in growing and modernising its military, and is increasingly able to project military and paramilitary force beyond its immediate region.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

New Zealand also calls out Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine and North Korea\u2019s nuclear weapons program as challenging the effectiveness of international institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The government also notes that strategic interest in Antarctica and the continent\u2019s surrounding waters is growing, but fails to mention its March 2022 decision to defer the purchase of a regional patrol vessel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Principles and assumptions<\/h1>\n\n\n\n

The \u201cFuture Force Design Principles\u201d document describes eight areas \u201cdesigned to be scalable \u2014 from low to medium to high.\u201c<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u201cGiven the need for flexibility in force design,\u201d the government wrote, \u201cthey are movable and their positioning is a distinct policy choice. All principles are interrelated and must be used in combination to effectively deliver a coherent force. Each sliding principle includes a specified area on a scale.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Those principles include:<\/p>\n\n\n\n